


























Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary  Policy?  
A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries 
 
 
Ansgar Belke and Niklas Potrafke 
 



























 Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? 




University of Duisburg-Essen and DIW Berlin 
Niklas Potrafke
2 
University of Konstanz 
 
21 December 2011 
 
This paper has been accepted for publication in the  
Journal of International Money and Finance 
  
Abstract 
This paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in OECD 
countries. We use quarterly data in the 1980.1-2005.4 period and exclude EMU countries. Our 
Taylor-rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time-variant index of central bank 
independence with government ideology. The results show that leftist governments have 
somewhat lower short-term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central 
bank independence is low. In contrast, short-term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist 
governments when central bank independence is high. The effect is more pronounced when 
exchange rates are flexible. Our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments, in 
an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies, have pushed market-oriented 
policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers.  
Keywords: monetary policy, Taylor rule, government ideology, partisan politics, central bank 
independence, panel data 
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1.  Introduction 
Many scholars have investigated how government ideology influences monetary policy 
instruments such as interest rates in OECD countries (e.g., Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 1997, 
Boix 2000, Clark 2003 and Sakamoto 2008). Politicians, however, do not have a direct influence 
on interest rates, but are subject to institutional restrictions, most notably central bank 
independence. Ideology-induced politicians can therefore manipulate interest rate policies only 
when central banks are not independent and subject to directives of the government. Some 
previous empirical research has dealt with this interaction between central bank independence 
and government ideology. In contrast to the predictions of the partisan theories, it transpires that 
leftist governments do not always conduct expansionary monetary policies: when central bank 
independence was high, interest rates have rather been higher under leftist governments. These 
previous studies have, however, several shortcomings such as: (1) employing annual data 
although interest rates are remarkably volatile, (2) choosing ad-hoc econometric frameworks, (3) 
not considering exchange rate regimes and (4) not considering that government ideology may 
also influence inflation and the output gap (Berger and Woitek 2005). This paper deals with these 
shortcomings to re-examine whether leftist governments have implemented more expansionary 
monetary policies than rightwing governments. 
Our empirical strategy is to include government ideology, central bank (in)dependence 
and their interaction in a Taylor rule specification. We use a dataset containing quarterly data 
from 1980.1 to 2005.4 for 23 OECD countries excluding EMU countries, the government 
ideology index by Potrafke (2009), the new time-variant index on central bank (in)dependence by 
Arnone et al. (2007) and Klomp and de Haan (2009), and the exchange rate regime data proposed 
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). The results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower 
short-term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is 
low. In contrast, short-term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when 
central bank independence is high. The effect is more pronounced when exchange rates were -2- 
 
flexible. Our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments, in an attempt to 
deflect blame of their traditional constituencies, have pushed market-oriented policies by 
delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical considerations of the 
influence of government ideology on monetary policy and reviews the empirical literature. 
Section 3 presents the data and specifies the empirical model. Section 4 reports the regression 




2. Theoretical background and empirical evidence 
2.1 Partisan approach 
The partisan approach is based on the assumption that politicians provide policies that reflect the 
preferences of their clienteles (partisans).
3 Leftist parties appeal more to the labor base and 
promote expansionary policies, whereas rightwing parties appeal more to capital owners and are 
therefore more concerned with reducing inflation. This characterization holds for both branches 
of the partisan theory - the classical approach (Hibbs 1977) and the rational expectations 
approach (Alesina 1987).
4 The traditional partisan theory contains that leftist governments 
produce higher inflation and lower unemployment. The rational partisan theory, on the other 
hand, predicts upward (downward) post-election blips in unemployment for rightwing (leftwing) 
regimes due to wage rigidities in an environment of electoral uncertainty.  
The implications of the partisan theories have been tested empirically by investigating 
various policy instruments. Several studies - mainly undertaken in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s – have focused on money growth, fewer studies have analyzed political manipulations of 
interest rates. Central bank independence has been ignored in this literature. For encompassing 
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surveys on empirical tests of the partisan theories till the mid 1990s see, for example, Belke 
(1996).  
 
2.2 Central bank independence and channels of transmission 
Evaluating the influence of government ideology on monetary policy requires considering central 
bank independence, i.e., the central bank’s ability to choose policy goals and to control the use of 
monetary policy instruments without government interference.
5 In other words, independent 
central banks control both the means and ends of monetary policy. Even very autonomous 
central banks do however not operate in a political vacuum (Hayo and Hefeker 2002, Lohmann 
1998). To preserve their independence and to fend off legislation aimed at changing the central 
bank´s organization, autonomous banks such as the German Bundesbank or the U.S. Federal 
Reserve Bank, had to accommodate to political pressure. For example, public support for the 
central bank needs to be sufficiently strong if it wants to successfully implement harsh monetary 
policy measures (Hayo and Hefeker 2002). Hence, although some central banks are clearly more 
independent than others, no bank is perfectly insulated from the demands of electoral or partisan 
politics.
6 
Government ideology influences central banks and thereby monetary policy via three 
main channels: (1) central bank appointments (Falaschetti 2002, Galbraith et al. 2007, Havrilesky 
and Gildea 1992, Lohmann 1998, Waller 1992, Chappell, Havrilesky and McGregor 1993); (2) 
direct signalling of the government´s desired monetary policies (Havrilesky 1988, 1991, Sieg, 
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1997)
7, and (3) bashing and reorganization threats by the government (García de Paso 2000, 
Lohmann 1998, Waller 1991). We now elaborate on these channels. 
The board of the central bank is usually appointed by the government or by parliament. A 
political party, be it in government or in opposition having the right to make a proposal, tends to 
nominate council members with political preferences similar to its own (Havrilesky and Gildea 
1992; Havrilesky 1993, Vaubel 1993, 1997a and Berger and Woitek 1997).
8 The nominated 
council members, in turn, feel loyal to the party which has appointed them (Goehlmann and 
Vaubel 2007). It is therefore conceivable that council members follow a specific party line, and 
may even try to manipulate the economy to increase the election prospects of their favored party. 
Investigating the voting pattern of Fed board members, Chappell et al. (1993) conclude that the 
appointment process is the primary mechanism through which party ideologies are brought to 
bear in central bank councils.  
Signaling policy preferences is another important channel of influencing central banks. 
The government sends monetary policy signals to the central bank using, for example, media 
appearances in which government officials express a desire for an easier or tighter monetary 
policy. This kind of signaling is expected to influence the money supply because the media 
coverage of government performance is typically strongly related to the state of the economy. 
Money growth usually does not provoke high-profile media attention, but does, nevertheless, 
respond to signals from the administration (McGregor, 1996). Oversight might influence 
monetary policy as well (Caporale and Grier 1998, Grier 1991, 1996, Falaschetti 2002). 
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Ideology-induced politicians can, finally, put pressure on the members of the central bank 
council with the help of bashing and reorganization threats. Threatening the status, structure, or 
even the existence of the central bank may be used to force central bankers to comply with 
politically motivated demands with respect to monetary policy (Lohmann 1998).  
 
 
2.3 Empirical evidence 
Empirical studies for OECD countries do not suggest that leftist governments have always 
pursued more expansionary monetary policies than under rightwing governments. Interest rates 
were even found to be higher under leftwing than rightwing governments when central bank 
independence was high. Only a few empirical studies do however use panel data (e.g Mukherjee 
and Singer 2008, Cusack 2001). Among the country studies, investigations for the U.S. and 
Germany dominate (e.,g., Abrams and Iossifov 2006, Caporale and Grier 2000, Corder 2006, 
Faust and Irons 1999, Berger and Woitek 1997a, 2001, 2005).  
Three empirical studies on partisan monetary policy in OECD countries are especially 
important.  Clark (2003) examines the influence of left-labor power on interest rates in a panel of 
up to 14 OECD countries and finds that left-labor power was associated with higher, not lower, 
interest rates. Boix (2000) investigates the influence of socialist control of government and the 
power of organized labor on short-term real interest rates in developed countries in the 1961-
1994 period. The evidence is mixed: the results depend on the sample and the specification. 
Some of his results do however suggest that central banks under leftist governments had higher 
short-term real interest rates than under rightwing governments. Sakamoto (2008) analyzes panel 
data for 18 OECD countries in the 1960-2001 period and distinguishes between leftwing, 
rightwing and center governments. His results (p. 154) suggest that under leftist governments 
central banks conducted a somewhat looser monetary policy
9, whereas the difference of the 
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estimated coefficients of rightwing and center governments is not statistically significant. 
Interacting the leftwing government dummy with central bank independence, however, suggests 
that leftist governments under independent central banks produced the tightest monetary policy. 
“This suggests that central banks may have tightened monetary policy to offset the left’s 
expansionary policy (remember that left governments’ fiscal policy was expansionary when they 
faced independent central banks in the 1960s and 1970s)” (Sakamoto 2008, p. 228). Interacting 
the rightwing government dummy with central bank independence, suggests that the 
combination of rightwing governments and independent central banks is likely to give rise to a 
loose (expansionary) monetary policy (p. 240). 
The studies by Clark (2003), Boix (2000) and Sakamoto (2008) employ annual data. This 
is a serious shortcoming because central bank interest rates are volatile and can change a great 
deal in a year. Different exchange rate regimes are also not considered. This is also a shortcoming 
because monetary policies are only expected to be effective when exchange rates are flexible. For 
this reason, more credible empirical models are required to examine whether in OECD countries 
leftist governments have been associated with lower interest rates than rightwing governments. 
 
 
3. Data and empirical strategy 
 
3.1 Data 
We use data provided by the OECD Economic Indicators (2008). The data set contains quarterly 
data for short-term nominal interest rates of 23 OECD countries. The countries included are 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The observation period runs 
from 1980.1 to 2005.4. Data for Germany are available since 1991.1 after the German 
Unification, for Ireland since 1984.1, for Iceland since 1988.1, and for Sweden since 1982.1. We 
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do not include, however, data for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain after 1998.4 because, beginning in 1999 in 
these countries the European Monetary Union was in charge of monetary policy. For the same 
reason, we do not include data for Greece after 2000.4 when it became a member of the 
European Monetary Union. Figure 1 illustrates the short-term nominal interest rates and Table 1 
provides descriptive statistics. Short-term nominal interest rates have been high in countries such 
as Spain (12.54), Greece (17.01), Italy (12.80) and Portugal (14.81) and low in countries such as 
Switzerland (4.00), Germany (5.77) and Japan (3.59). On average, short-term nominal interest 
were high in the beginning of the 1980s (maximum in 1981.3 with 15.36 points), and decreased 
till the beginning of this millennium (minimum in 2004.1 with 2.79 points). At the end of our 
observation period in 2005.4, short-term nominal interest rates were 3.89 points on average. 
 
Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 here 
 
3.2 Empirical strategy 
Our baseline model is based on the traditional Taylor rule specification (Taylor 1993a, b). The 
variables usually included in the Taylor rule to explain the variance in the short-term nominal 
interest rate are the domestic inflation rate, the output gap and the lagged short-term nominal 
interest rate. We also include a government ideology variable, a central bank independence 
variable and the respective interaction term to investigate how government ideology is mediated 
by central bank independence. The baseline panel data model has the following form: 
 
(1)  Short-term nominal interest rateit =  α Ideologyit + β CBDit + γ Ideologyit*CBDit  
+  Inflationit +  Output gapit +  Short-term nominal interest rateit-1 
+ ηi + εt + uit                                              
 -8- 
 
with i=1,…,23; t=1,…,104, 
where the dependent variable Short-term nominal interest rateit denotes the short-term nominal 
interest rate in country i and quarter t. Ideologyit describes the ideological orientation of the 
respective government and CBDit captures the degree of central bank dependence. In the next 
paragraphs we describe these variables and their coding in detail. We include the interaction term 
of government ideology and central bank dependence in order to identify potential differences 
between leftwing and rightwing governments facing high dependent or independent central 
banks. We follow the related literature on Taylor rule specifications by including the inflation 
rate, the output gap, and the lagged dependent variable.
10 Finally, ηi represents a fixed country 
effect, εt is a fixed period effect and uit describes an error term. 
We employ the government ideology index proposed by Potrafke (2009), which is derived 
from the index of governments’ ideological positions by Budge, Keman and Woldendorp (1993) 
and updated by Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (1998, 2000). This index places the cabinet on a 
left-right scale with values between 1 and 5. It takes the value 1 if the share of governing 
rightwing parties in terms of seats in the cabinet and in parliament is larger than 2/3, and 2 if it is 
between 1/3 and 2/3. The index is 3 if the share of center parties is 50%, or if the leftwing and 
rightwing parties form a coalition government that is not dominated by one side. The index is 
symmetric and takes the values 4 and 5 if the leftwing parties dominate. Potrafke’s (2009) coding 
is consistent across time but does not attempt to capture differences between the party-families 
across countries. Quarters in which the government changed are labeled according to the 
government that was in office for more days in this quarter. The coding of the ideology variable 
gives rise to the expectation that short-term interest rates vary negatively with the ideology index. 
Hence, we expect the estimated coefficient α in eq. (1) to be negative.  
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Government ideology is expected to influence short-term nominal interest rates only 
when central banks are subject to government directives. We use the overall index on central 
bank independence (CBI) developed by Arnone et al. (2007) and computed for additional years 
by Klomp and De Haan (2009). The index distinguishes between political autonomy (i.e., the 
ability of the central bank to choose the objectives of monetary policy) and economic autonomy 
(i.e., the ability of the central bank to choose the appropriate instruments). Arnone et al. (2007) 
developed the CBI index and applied it to several countries. Klomp and De Haan (2009) used the 
information on central bank law reform by Acemoglu et al. (2008) and measured the value of the 
CBI index for all the years for which Arnone et al. (2007) provided no data. In order to be in line 
with the coding of our ideology index, our framework requires an index that increases with 
central bank dependence (CBD). Because the CBI index measures central bank independence 
rather than central bank dependence, we apply the inverse of the CBI index. This time-variant 
CBD index assumes values between 0 (maximum independence) and 1 (maximum dependence).
11 
The expected sign of the estimated coefficient β of the CBD variable in eq. (1) is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, CBD could be expected to have a negative influence on the short term interest rate 
because independent, conservative central bankers will keep interest rates at a moderate level. On 
the other hand, CBD could have a positive influence on the short term interest rate because 
dependent central banks, being less credible, have higher interest rates. 
We include the interaction term Ideologyit*CBDit, to examine the effect of government 
ideology conditional on different values of central bank dependence (Friedrich 1982). We 
normalize both interacted variables (mean zero, variance one), so that we can directly interpret 
the coefficients and marginal effects across the specifications. In line with the predictions of the 
partisan approaches that leftwing governments implement more expansionary policies than 
rightwing governments, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term of government ideology 
(leftwing government) and central bank dependence is expected to be negative. Table 2 provides 
the descriptive statistics of the variables and the respective data sources. 
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Insert Table 2 here 
 
We now, finally, turn to discussing our choice of the panel data estimation methods. In 
the context of dynamic estimation, the common fixed-effect estimator is biased. In accordance 
with large sample properties of the GMM methods, e.g., the estimator proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) will also be biased in our econometric model with N=23. We therefore apply 
Bruno`s (2005a, 2005b) bias corrected least squares dummy variable estimator for dynamic panel 




4.1 Basic results 
Table 3 reports the regression results for the baseline Taylor rule specification. The control 
variables display the expected sign and their influence is robust across the different specifications 
(columns 1-3). The coefficients of the inflation rate and the output gap are statistically significant 
at the 1% level in all three specifications. The positive influence of the inflation rate and the 
output gap are in line with the predictions of the Taylor rule. The Taylor rule theoretically 
predicts the long-run influence of the inflation rate on the short-term nominal interest rate to be 
2.0 and the long-run influence of the output gap on the short-term nominal interest rate to be 0.5 
(Taylor 1999, Clarida et al. 1998, Woodford 2001). The long-run effect of inflation can be 
calculated by dividing the coefficient of the inflation rate variable by one minus the coefficient of 
the lagged dependent variable. The results suggest that short-term nominal interest rate increases 
in the long-run by about 1.5 points when the inflation rate increases by one point and that the 
short-term nominal interest rate increases in the long-run by about 0.65 points when the output 
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gap increases by one point. The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant at the 1% 
level and its coefficient implies that short-term nominal interest rates are strongly persistent. 
Overall, our specification of the Taylor reaction function provides a suitable benchmark for our 
further investigations.  
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Column (2) reports the regression results when the ideology variable is included and 
shows that the ideology variable does not turn out to be statistically significant. This first result 
suggests that monetary policy is not expansive under leftist governments and contradicts at a first 
glance the partisan theory. The absence of any influence of government ideology on short-term 
nominal interest rates would have, however, to be corroborated by a negligible influence of the 
interaction of government ideology with central bank dependence. Column (3) shows the results 
of the model including government ideology, central bank dependence and the interaction of the 
two variables: the interaction term turns out to be sizable and statistically significant. 
The marginal effects of the ideology variable have to be interpreted conditionally on the 
interaction with central bank dependence. In principle, there are two sensible ways to evaluate the 
marginal effects. We follow Dreher and Gassebner (2011) and evaluate the marginal effects at the 
minimum as well as the maximum of the interacted variable, i.e. central bank dependence. Using 
this method we are able to distinguish between the influence of government ideology on short-
term interest rates for high and low central bank dependence. Alternatively, one can choose to 
evaluate the marginal effects at the average level of central bank dependence. The marginal 
effects reported in Table 4 imply that the marginal effect of government ideology at the average 
level of central bank dependence perfectly corresponds with the value reported in Table 3 in 
column (3). At an average level of central bank dependence, government ideology did not 
influence short term nominal interest rates. In line with the partisan approach, however, 
government ideology (leftwing) had a negative influence on short-term nominal interest rates -12- 
 
when central bank dependence was high, i.e. when it was at its maximum. At maximum 
dependence, an increase of the ideology variable by one point – say from 3 (leftwing and 
rightwing parties in government) to 4 (leftwing government) – decreases the short-term nominal 
interest rate by about 0.11 points. This effect is statistically significant at the 10% level. By 
contrast, government ideology (leftwing) had a significant positive influence on short-term 
nominal interest rates when central bank dependence was low, i.e. when it is at its minimum. At a 
minimum of central bank dependence an increase of the ideology variable by one point raises the 
short-term nominal interest rate by 0.12 points (column 2). This effect is also statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
4.2 Exchange rate regimes 
The exchange rate regime influences the effects of monetary policy and can therefore be 
expected to change the behavior of the political agents. The Mundell-Flemming model, for 
example, predicts that monetary policy affects the real economy only when exchange rates are 
flexible. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, open market policies result only in a change of the 
central bank´s asset portfolio composition.
13 We employ the exchange rate regime data by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) to investigate whether our findings are subject to the prevailing 
exchange rate regime. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) distinguish between five different exchange 
rate regimes: (1) Peg, (2) Limited Flexibility, (3) Managed Floating, (4) Freely Floating and (5) 
Freely Falling. We estimate the empirical model for different exchange rate regimes; that is we 
estimate our model for country/quarter observations at times of “Limited Flexibility” (regime 2) 
or more flexible exchange rate regimes (regime 3, 4 and 5); then for country/quarter observations 
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at times of “Managed Floating” (regime 3) or more flexible exchange rate regimes (regime 4 and 
5); and finally for country/quarter observations where the exchange rate system is described by 
“Freely Floating” (regime 4) or “Freely Falling” (regime 5). There are too few observations of 
pegged and freely falling exchange rate regimes to run regressions only with these observations. 
The results in Table 5 show that only under managed floating and freely floating exchange rates, 
short-term nominal interest rates are higher under leftwing governments when central banks were 
independent. The marginal effects (Table 6) are positive and statistically significant at the 1% and 
5% level at the minimum and average level of central bank dependence for the regressions in 
columns (2) and (3). At a maximum of central bank dependence the marginal effect does not turn 
out to be statistically significant under freely floating exchange rates and is statistically significant 
at the 10% level with a negative sign under managed floating exchange rates.  
 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 here 
 
4.3 Interacting government ideology with inflation and output gap  
Rightwing and leftwing monetary policymakers are expected to react differently to shocks that 
pose a tradeoff between stabilizing inflation and output (Svensson 1997, Woodford 2003). Berger 
and Woitek (2005) have shown that more conservative Bundesbank council members tend to 
react more strongly to changes in inflation and output. We have therefore included terms 
capturing the interaction between government ideology and inflation and between government 
ideology and the output gap. We have normalized all variables before interacting. Table 7 shows 
the regression results and Table 8 the marginal effects. We have evaluated the influence of 
government ideology on the short-term nominal interest rates at the average level of inflation and 
the average level of the output gap, and, as before, at the average, minimum and maximum of 
central bank dependence. The results in Table 8 show that our previous inferences regarding the 
political economic variables do not change: government ideology does not influence short-term -14- 
 
nominal interest rates at an average level of central bank dependence. Short-term nominal interest 
rates are lower under leftwing governments than under rightwing governments when central 
bank dependence is high. Short-term nominal interest rates are higher under leftwing 
governments than under rightwing governments when central bank dependence is low. Both 
effects are statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Insert Tables 7 and 8 here 
 
4.4 Further robustness checks 
We have conducted further robustness checks of our results. It is conceivable that fiscal policy 
also influences interest rates either directly or via government ideology and central bank 
(in)dependence. Very few fiscal policy variables are available at a quarterly basis. Data on 
government deficits are, for example, available at a quarterly basis only for some of the countries 
and some sub periods of our sample. We therefore had to settle for government final 
consumption expenditure (real, in local currencies) because this variable is available for all 
countries in our sample.
14 We have estimated two models: first, we have included government 
final consumption expenditure as an additional explanatory variable; second we have also 
interacted government final consumption expenditure with government ideology and evaluated 
the marginal effect at the average level of government final consumption expenditure. The 
marginal effects show for both models that government ideology does not influence short-term 
nominal interest rates. The marginal effect evaluated at the minimum of central bank dependence 
slightly fails statistical significance at conventional levels.  
We have replaced the ideology and CBD indicators by simple binary versions of these 
variables: 1) a time variant dummy variable that is 1 for readings of CBI and ideology that are 
above the overall sample mean at period t and 0 otherwise; (2) a dummy variable that is 1 for 
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readings of CBI and ideology that are above the sample mean for the particular country at time t 
and 0 otherwise. We have also interacted the binary ideology variables with the CBD indicators 
to evaluate the ideology-induced effects at different levels of central bank dependence. Inferences 
do not change. 
It is also conceivable that the reported effects are driven or mitigated by idiosyncratic 
circumstances in some few countries. We have therefore tested whether the results are sensitive 
to the inclusion/exclusion of particular countries. The positive influence of leftist governments at 
a maximum level of central bank independence decreases when Greece, Norway, Sweden and the 
United States are excluded. In contrast, the effects become stronger when Iceland and New 





We have included government ideology, central bank (in)dependence and their interaction in a 
Taylor rule specification to re-examine whether leftist governments have implemented 
expansionary monetary policies than rightwing governments. Our dataset contains quarterly data 
from 1980.1 to 2005.4 for 23 OECD countries excluding EMU countries. The results show that, 
as predicted by the partisan theories, short-term nominal interest rates are somewhat lower under 
leftwing governments than under rightwing governments, but this only applies when central bank 
dependence is high. Ideology-induced politicians thus appear to implement their preferred 
policies when central bankers are obliged to follow their directives. This effect is however not 
robust across different empirical specifications. Short-term nominal interest rates are higher 
under leftwing governments than under rightwing governments when central banks are 
independent. This empirical finding has been already derived by Sakamoto (2008). We have re-
examined the influence of government ideology and central bank independence on interest rates 
because the previous studies have shortcomings. We have used quarterly instead of annual data 
because interest rates are remarkably volatile, and we have controlled for different exchange rate -16- 
 
regimes because monetary policy is not effective under a fixed exchange regime. Moreover, we 
have also considered the interaction of government ideology with inflation and the output gap 
(Berger and Woitek 2005). The methodological improvements notwithstanding, we confirm the 
inferences of the previous research. 
The result that short-term nominal interest rates are higher under leftwing governments 
than under rightwing governments when central banks are independent deserves further 
discussion. In the course of declining electoral cohesion, leftwing OECD-country governments 
appear to have delegated responsibility for more market-oriented policies to independent central 
bankers (Sakamoto 2008, Bernhard 2002). In a similar vein, Crowe (2008, p. 749) concludes that: 
“The motive for delegating the monetary policy decision to a fully (goal-) independent central 
bank is that it removes the intra-coalition conflict over monetary policy from the political arena”. 
Leftwing parties themselves might also have an interest in maintaining central bank independence 
because a central bank that is believed to be neutral is a better 'scapegoat' for the stabilization 
recession that follows expansionary policy experiments (Kane 1980 and Vaubel 1997a.). We 
acknowledge that our government ideology index does not consider party changes over time. 
Hardly any government ideology index that is available for OECD countries explicitly considers 
party changes over time. Previous research on ideology-induced economic policy-making in 
OECD countries has also shown that the choice of existing government ideology indices does 
not influence the inferences (i.e., Pickering and Rockey 2011). Future research may however deal 
with government ideology coding which considers party movements such as the shift of the 
political left in the 1990s. 
It is also conceivable that politicians and central bankers have different views on the 
efficacy of policy instruments and they probably care about different economic indicators. 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2011) show, for example, that politicians express a preference for 
lower interest rates than central bankers. Conservative central bankers may also have 
counteracted any attempts of expansionary policies under leftist governments. An empirical test -17- 
 
of this conjecture requires a measure on political preferences of the central bankers which also 
remains to be developed in future research. 
Some studies have used real-time data for inflation and output growth to estimate Taylor 
rules (i.e., Sturm and De Haan 2011, Orphanides 2001). We have not used real-time data because 
of lack of data availability for our sample. In a similar vein, we have employed a 
contemporaneous Taylor rule specification, while scholars also have employed forward-looking 
Taylor-rule specifications (i.e., Sauer and Sturm 2007). Future research on political economic 
determinants of monetary policy may therefore use forward-looking Taylor rule specifications 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. Short term nominal interest rates. Country List. 
Country Mean  St.  Dev.  N 
Australia 9.58  4.64  104 
Austria 6.60  2.52  76 
Belgium 8.56  3.56  76 
Canada 7.71  4.20  104 
Switzerland 4.00  2.64  104 
Germany 5.77  2.49  32 
Denmark 8.10  4.63  104 
Spain 12.54  4.20  76 
Finland 10.27  4.18  76 
France 9.04  3.44  76 
United Kingdom  8.76  3.75  104 
Greece 17.01  4.96  84 
Ireland 9.39  3.60  60 
Iceland 11.31  7.64  72 
Italy 12.80  4.19  76 
Japan 3.59  3.24  104 
Luxembourg 8.56  3.56  76 
Netherlands 6.60  2.51  76 
Norway 9.09  4.18  104 
New Zealand  10.98  5.38  104 
Portugal 14.81  5.55  76 
Sweden 7.93  4.10  96 
United States  6.76  3.88  104 





Table 2. Descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev  Min  Max  Source 
Short-term nominal interest 
rate 
1964 9.01  5.21  0.03  37.67  OECD Main Economic 
Indicatiors (2008) 
Ideology 2064  2.86  0.87  1 4  Potrafke  (2009) 
Central bank dependence  1984  0.51  0.21 0.06 0.81  Klomp and de Haan (2009) 
Inflation (CPI growth)  2064  1.32  1.76 -1.66  23.32  OECD  Main  Economic 
Indicators (2011) 
Output gap  2020  -0.11  1.52  -7.13 6.76  OECD  Main  Economic 
Indicators (2008) 
Exchange rate regime  2064  2.37  1.07  1  5  Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) 
Final Consumption 
expenditures 







Table 3. Regression results. Ideology and central bank dependence interacted (normalized). 
Dependent variable: short-term nominal interest rate.  
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Ideology (leftwing government)   0.0100  -0.0167 
   [0.0347]  [0.0370] 
Central bank dependence     0.1793*** 
     [0.0642] 
Ideology (leftwing government)* Central bank dependence    -0.0636** 
     [0.0284] 
Inflation  0.2592*** 0.2590*** 0.2448*** 
  [0.0353] [0.0352] [0.0270] 
Output gap  0.1125*** 0.1123*** 0.1070*** 
  [0.0208] [0.0209] [0.0218] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.8312*** 0.8306*** 0.8324*** 
  [0.0151] [0.0151] [0.0146] 
Fixed  Country  Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Period Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1941 1941 1884 
Number of N  23 23 23 







Table 4. Marginal effects of government ideology (leftwing government) at a minimum, average 




































Table 5. Regression results. Different exchange rate regimes. 
Dependent Variable: short-term nominal interest rate.  
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
  (1) (2)  (3) 






Ideology (leftwing government)  0.0104  0.1107*** 0.1266* 
 [0.0411]  [0.0408] [0.0674] 
Central bank dependence  0.1865**  0.2676*** -0.0355 
 [0.0735]  [0.0807] [0.3862] 
Ideology (leftwing government)* Central bank dependence -0.0409  -0.1318*** -0.1305 
 [0.0471]  [0.0459] [0.0796] 
Inflation 0.2785***  0.1916*** 0.1855** 
 [0.0472]  [0.0482] [0.0731] 
Output gap  0.1154***  0.0763*** 0.1465*** 
 [0.0295]  [0.0283] [0.0503] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.8029***  0.8588*** 0.8822*** 
 [0.0160]  [0.0247] [0.0330] 
Fixed Country Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Period Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1395  745 312 
Number of N  21  15 6 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 






Table 6. Marginal effects of government ideology (leftwing government) at a minimum, average 
and maximum level of central bank dependence (normalized) 
Different exchange rate regimes. 
  (1) (2)  (3) 


































Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 







Table 7. Regression results. Ideology and central bank dependence interacted (normalized). 
Dependent variable: short-term nominal interest rate.  
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
 (1) 
Ideology (leftwing government)  -0.0241 
  [0.0374] 
Central bank dependence  0.1786*** 
  [0.0646] 
Ideology (leftwing government)* Central bank dependence -0.0608** 
  [0.0306] 
Inflation  0.3232*** 
  [0.0359] 
Ideology (leftwing government)*Inflation  -0.0053 
  [0.0269] 
Output gap  0.1482*** 
  [0.0327] 
Ideology (leftwing government)*Output gap  -0.0424 
  [0.0324] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.8327*** 
  [0.0147] 
Fixed Country Effects  Yes 
Fixed Period Effects  Yes 
Observations  1884 
Number of N  23 







Table 8. Marginal effects of government ideology (leftwing government) at a minimum, average 


























Figure 1. Short-term nominal interest rates. 23 OECD countries. 1980.1.-2005.4.  
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Table A1. Regression results. Ideology and central bank dependence interacted (normalized). 
Government consumption included. 
Dependent variable: short-term nominal interest rate.  
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
 (1)  (2) 
Ideology (leftwing government)  0.0065 0.0072 
  [0.0326] [0.0327] 
Central bank dependence  0.1561*** 0.1562*** 
  [0.0578] [0.0578] 
Ideology (leftwing government)* Central bank dependence  -0.0471 -0.0472 
  [0.0288] [0.0289] 
Inflation  0.3096*** 0.3096*** 
  [0.0387] [0.0387] 
Output gap  0.1298*** 0.1299*** 
  [0.0167] [0.0167] 
Government consumption  -9×10-7 -0.0112 
  [0.0000] [0.1073] 
Ideology (leftwing government)* Government consumption   0.0035 
   [0.0668] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.8108*** 0.8108*** 
  [0.0155] [0.0156] 
Fixed Country Effects  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Period Effects  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1825  1825 
Number of N  23  23 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table A2. Marginal effects of government ideology (leftwing government) at a minimum, average 
and maximum level of central bank dependence (normalized) 


































Table A3. Regression results. Ideology and central bank dependence interacted. 
Binary variables. 
Dependent variable: short-term nominal interest rate.  
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Leftwing government (binary time)  0.0673      
  [0.0752]      
Central bank dependence (binary time)  0.2860**      
  [0.1120]      
Leftwing government (binary time)* 
Central bank dependence (binary time)  -0.2256*     
 
  [0.1151]      
Leftwing government (binary country)   0.0844    
   [0.1423]    
Central bank dependence (binary country)   0.3616***    
   [0.1246]    
Leftwing government (binary country)* 
Central bank dependence (binary country)   -0.2365  
 
   [0.1643]    
Leftwing government (binary time)     -0.0551   
     [0.0666]   
Central bank dependence      0.2101***   
     [0.0670]   
Leftwing government (binary time)* 
Central bank dependence       -0.0948* 
 
     [0.0525]   
Leftwing government (binary country)      -0.0496 
      [0.0753] 
Central bank dependence       0.2488***
      [0.0677] 
Leftwing government (binary country)* 
Central bank dependence       -0.1430**
      [0.0604] 
Inflation  0.2452*** 0.2490*** 0.2451***  0.2463***
  [0.0261] [0.0266] [0.0270]  [0.0267] 
Output gap  0.1081*** 0.1051*** 0.1080***  0.1063***
  [0.0221] [0.0219] [0.0220]  [0.0217] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.8377*** 0.8368*** 0.8337***  0.8330***
  [0.0148] [0.0145] [0.0148]  [0.0146] 
Fixed Country Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Period Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1884 1884 1884  1884 
Number of N  23 23 23  23 














Table A4. Marginal effects of government ideology (leftwing government) at a minimum, average 
and maximum level of central bank dependence (normalized). 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Minimum 



























Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
 
 